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APPENDIX A
SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV 80-5

KENNEBEC, SS.

*
*
Plaintiff *
*
*
v.
*
WILLIAM STAMLEY ;

STATE OF MAINE

CONSENT ORDER

Defendant *

1-

Plaintiff, State of Maine, filed its Complaint and .

Affidavit alleging, in part, that the Defendant has operated
his asphalt paving and sealing business in violation of the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A.
and the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act
2.

§ 46 61 et_ s e g .)

(5 M.R.S.A.

§ 206 et s e a . )

Plaintiff and Defendant mutually have approved the

terms of this Order.
3.

Therefore, this Court finding that the Complaint states

a cause of action and that it has jurisdiction in this matter,
hereby permanently enjoins the Defendant, his agents, employees,
persons acting in concert with him, in soliciting contracts for
paving jobs from:
A.

Violating the requirements of the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act;

B.

Not informing customers they have three business
days to avoid the contract; and

2

C.

St.art.inq work before the three business day
period has passed.

4.

Further, this Court orders the Defendant to use written

contracts that incorporate language reasonably equivalent to
paragraphs 1, 3, 4,
5.

6 and 7 of the attached sample contract.

The Defendant understands that this Consent Order refers

only to how the Defendant will solicit business in the future but
does not resolve the issue of whether any consumer is owed damages
or repairs for past unfair trade practices by the Defendant.

This

aspect of the State's Complaint remains before the Court for
permanent resolution.
6.

The Court retains jurisdiction over the subject matter

of this action and its parties for the purpose of applying to this
Court at any time for further orders or directions which may be
appropriate.
Dated at Augusta this

3

( $7

Seen and Agreed by:

~t)ef endapÆ

JAMES A. MCKENNA, III
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer and Antitrust Division

VJITNESS

r. -

ADDRESS
PHONE
CUSTOMER'S NAME
ADDRESS
PHONE
3.

C U S T O M E R'S-RIGHT TO C A NC E L CONTRACT W ITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS.
customer can

cancel

this

contract w ithin

three business

to the C ontractor notice of cancellation.
the Contractor
within
the day
work

at the

three business
this

agreed

days

contract

WORK TO BE DONE.

permit,

6.

The

C ontractor will

contract until

The Contractor,

As

this work

for

to start

__ ,

not begin

to complete

the

day c a n 

The C us t o m e r will pay

roilows:

for

the work agreed

to be done

is as followsi

the C o n t r a c t o r 1s :control

19

PAYMENT TERMS.

and is

to be completed

the Contractor's work

as

____________________________

This

d o c ument contains

anti the customer

botti par ties and dated.
rqo

following

the sum of ?___________ , wilt

as conditions beyond

.

cractor

the mail

three business

The work

_______ 19

NATURES.

the

labor and e q u i pment

long
is

in

and Sunday do not count)

and w o r k m an l i k e manner.

STARTING DATE.

notice must be sent to

and must be placed

(Saturday

by mailing

passed.

furnish ail materials,
to in a good

above

is signed.

to in this

cellation period has

4.

address

This

days

The

the entire

It is not

agreement be tween

a binding

contrae t until

Tor ¿in y additi o n a l work

the

the c u s t o m e r extra.
Con tractor
Cus tornar

Da te

V

the
signed

centractear may

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

¿0

REG
AT'

I

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-80-511

1 9 '¡99Ij
STATE OF MAINE,

JBTATE HOUc\

" ' " y MAmE j

T
)
)
)

Plaintiff

ORDER

v.
WILLIAM C. STANLEY,
Defendant

This matter was before the court for testimonial hearing on
the State's Motion for Civil Penalties

and for amendment of a

Consent Order issued by this court on August 31, 1981.

Hearing

was had on November 5, 1991, and the court has separately issued
its

findings

decision.
1.

of

fact,

conclusions' of

law,

and memorandum

of

The court now enters the following order:
Motion

of

the

State .for

civil

penalties

and

for

amendment of Consent Order of August 31, 1981, GRANTED.
2.

Civil penalties ordered paid in the amount of $4,500.00,

said payment to be made within one year from the date of this
order.
3.

Restitution

ordered paid

through

the

office

of

the

Attorney General for the' benefit of Mr. and Mrs. Louis Gantnier in
the amount of $2,500.00.

Payment to be made within six (6) months

of the date of this order.
4.
employees

The

defendant,

or persons

William

C.

Stanley,

and

any

acting with him or' on his behalf,

agents,
or on

t

2

behalf of a company controlled by him,

are permanently enjoined

from engaging in door-to-door solicitation of paving jobs.
5.

The injunctive portion of this order is, however, stayed

and will not become effective or be enforced unless and until Mr.
Stanley again violates

the Consumer Solicitation

Sales

Act

or

violates the Consent Order of August 31, 1981, or this order.
6.

In order to enforce this conditional

injunction,

the

court orders that Mr. Stanley file a copy of each contract entered
into with the Consumer and Antitrust Division of the Office of the
Attorney General within five
contracts are entered into.

(5) days of the date on which the

Each contract is to contain the name,

complete mailing address and telephone number of each person with
whom Mr. Stanley contracts.
7.

In the event of a violation of the Consumer Solicitation

Sales Act or the Consent Order of August 31,
order,

the

stay

will

be

lifted

and the

1981,

or of this

permanent

injunction

against door-to-door solicitation of paving work will be in full
force and effect.

DATED:

November 19, 1991
'BRUCE tf. CHANDLER
JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-80-511

MAINE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
v.
WILLIAM C. STANLEY,
Defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This matter is before the court on the State's Motion for
Civil Penalties and for amendment of a Consent Order issued by
this court on August 31,
involving

more

than

a

1981.

This was a testimonial hearing

dozen witnesses

who

appeared

hearing which lasted most of the day on November 5,

during
1991.

a
In

arriving at its decision in this matter, the court has, of course,
considered the evidence presented both by way of testimony and
through exhibits, as well as the memorandum submitted by the State
in support ot its motion.

Having considered all of the evidence

presented and the applicable law,
findings

of

fact,

its

the court herewith makes

conclusions

of

law,

and

announces

its
it

decision in this matter.
FINDINGS
1.

OF

FACT

Under the terms of the Consent Order of August 31, 1981,

the court permanently enjoined the defendant William Stanley or
any agents, employees or persons acting with him, from:

)

2

a)

violating the requirements of the Consumer Solicitation

Sales Act;
b)

not informing customers that they had three (3) business

days to avoid the contract;
c)

starting work

on a paving

contract

before the

three

business day period passed; and
d)

ordered the defendant to use written contracts according

to a model which was attached to the order.
2.

In the August

31,

1981 order,

the court

specifically

retained jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties so
that

further

action

could be taken by the

court

as might

be

necessary.
3.

In August

of

1987,

the defendant's

company did

some

paving work for Oliver W. Holmes in Eastport who at that time was
72 years old.
4.

Mr. Holmes paid Quality Paving, Mr. Stanley's company,

$3,675.00 for the job.
5.

Mr.

Holmes was

felt that he had been
worth,

and attempted

extremely dissatisfied with the work,

charged approximately twice what
repeatedly to contact M r . Stanley

it was
to

no

avail.
6.

Mr. Stanley, however, had not solicited this job but, in

fact, had been approached by Mr. Holmes while working on another
job and followed him to his home at Mr. Holmes's request in order
to give an estimate.
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7.

The work for Mr. Holmes was done immediately after the

contract was signed or at the latest on the following day.
8.

In June of 1990 Mr. Stanley appeared at a restaurant in

Medway owned and operated by Ngoc Thi Gantnier.
9.

At that time, Mr. Stanley offered to do some paving work

for Mrs. Gantnier.
10.

The specific conversation between Mrs. Gantnier and Mr.

Stanley cannot be determined but Mr. Stanley did do a considerable
amount of paving work immediately after his conversation with Mrs.
Gantnier.
11.

Again a contract was signed and the work was performed

on the same day.
12.

Mr. Stanley apparently received payment both from Mrs.

Gantnier and from Mr. Gantnier, who attempted to stop payment on
their check but were not successful.
13.

The

amount

of

the

contract

signed

for the

work

was

$3,990.00, although Mrs. Gantnier had expected that the work would
cost some $750.00.
14.

What Mrs. Gantnier had wanted done was to have

some

large potholes filled but Mr. Stanley ended up paving some 3,000
square feet in front of the restaurant and did some other work in
front of the Post Office which is also owned by the Gantniers.
15.

When approached by Trooper Matthew Grant with regard to

this matter, Mr. Stanley acknowledged familiarity with the Consent
Order and indicated that he had previously served some jail time
for similar conduct.

f
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16.

The job done for the Gantniers probably should have cost

between $1,200.00 to $2,500.00,

although excavation,

patch work

and doing the work by hand rather than by machine might have added
to the cost.
17.

In

driveways

May,

of

1986,

Katherine

Mr.

Stanley

Kucharski,

did

Hazel

paving

work

Linnell,

on

and

the

Hilda

Stevens, all of whom were neighbors on Victor Road in Portland.
18.

With regard to

each of these

jobs,

the contract was

signed and the work performed on the same day or at least without
waiting

three

business

days

before

starting

the- work

after

obtaining the signed contract.
19.
and

all

None of these people were satisfied with the work done
attempted to

get

in touch with Mr.

Stanley but

were

largely unsuccessful.
20.

At least one of these people was approached on a door-to-

door basis but also at least one of these people had the work done
because they observed Mr. Stanley doing work for a neighbor.
21.

In July of 1988, Mr. Stanley did some work for Paul Cote

in Old Orchard Beach, which work was done on the same day that the
contract was signed.
22.

In September,

1984, Mr. Stanley approached the disabled

husband of Dorothy Loker in Falmouth, procured a signed contract,
and proceeded to begin the paving work immediately.
23.

This matter was investigated by Detective Brady of the

Falmouth Police Department,

an arrest warrant

was

issued,

and

<
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eventually the entire amount paid

($700.00)

was returned to the

Lokers.
24.

In August,

1990/ Mr. Stanley performed paving services

for Margaret Meakin of Dexter (Corinna).
25.
Stanley's

On

the Meakin

company,

job a Mr.

Smith,

was the person who

an

employee

of

Mr.

actually negotiated the

agreement and indicated that the contract would be marked back to
the 9th from the 15th of August in order to take care of the threeday waiting period requirement.
26.

Work on the Meakin job began the day after the contract

was actually signed.
27.

On July 17, 1990, a contract was signed by Mr. Stanley

with Dorothy and Fred Gray who owned a roller rink in Milo.
28.

The paving work called for by that contract was done on

the same day that the contract was signed.
29.

On July 19, 1990, a contract was signed by the defendant

for paving services for Donald Eichel of Milo and the work was
done on the same day that the contract was signed.
30.

Mr. Stanley has been in the paving business for about 13

years having learned it from his father.
31.

He has been married for 16 years and has three children.

32.

Mr. Stanley is about 35 years old and on average earns

about $500 to $600 per week on an annual basis.
33.

Mr. Stanley carries no insurance, he rents his home, and

all of his equipment is mortgaged to the bank.
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34.

A majority of his paving jobs are obtained from door-to-

door sales work and he probably has done 200 to 250 driveways per
year since the entering of the Consent Decree in 1981.
35.

None of the contracts mentioned above gave the customer

notice that there was a three-day waiting period; that is, that
the customer had the right to cancel the contract within three
days of the date of signing; many did not give the company's name,
address or telephone number;

and some were never signed by the

customers.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

OF__LAH

Maine law requires that a contract of the type entered

into by Mr. Stanley with his customers contain a plain notice to
the potential customer that the customer has a right to cancel the
contract within three business days.
2.
clearly

The

Consent

enjoined

the

Order

of August

defendant

from

31,

1981,

soliciting

plainly

and

contracts

or

entering into contracts which in any way violated the requirements
of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act and clearly required the
defendant or any of his agents or employees to inform customers
that they had three business

days within

which to cancel the

contract.
3.

That

same order plainly

enjoined the

defendant

from

starting on any paving job solicited by him within three days of
the date of the contract signing.
4.

The law allows the court to impose civil penalties of up

to $10,000 for each violation.’
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5.

The law also allows the court to order restitution to

any customers who are dealt with by a defendant in violation of
the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
OF__DECISION

MEMORANDUM

It is clear from the evidence in this case that the defendant
has

on numerous

occasions

directly violated the terms

of the

August 31, 1981 Consent Order, and at the same time has violated
various provisions of State law.

The court realizes that with

regard to several of the specific instances presented at trial,
the

defendant

has

presented

another

version

of

exactly

what

happened, and it is also clear that in several cases the defendant
did not actually knock on a door to solicit the job but was,
fact,

in

referred by someone else or approached by a person while

doing another job with a request that they come to that person's
home or business and look at a proposed job.

It is also clear

that the defendant was familiar with the terms of the Consent
Order and that he was familiar with what could happen if the law
was violated since he indicated he had spent some time in jail as
a result of this type of conduct.

The question is not whether

there were violations since it is clear that there were beyond any
possible argument, but rather what the remedy should be.
The

State's

view

is

that

this

conduct

is

particularly

egregious because it was done in direct violation of a properly
issued injunction which was in full and effect, and perhaps more
serious, the conduct involved people who were ready targets, i.e.,
elderly

people,

foreign

language

speaking

people,

infirm

or

i
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disabled people,

etc.

The State asks that full restitution be

paid to the people who were dissatisfied with the work done, that
a

heavy

civil

violation,

penalty

be

imposed

on

Mr.

Stanley

for

each

and most importantly that he be permanently enjoined

from any door-to-door solicitation of paving jobs.
The

defense

not

surprisingly

attempts

to

minimize

the

seriousness of the violations while admitting that some violations
did take place and points out that the dissatisfactions with the
jobs were

for the most part

rather minimal,

i.e.,

tire marks,

porous appearance, some depressions, etc.
The court has attempted to review each of the violations
which

were

presented

at

trial

in

some

detail.

The

court's

conclusion is that except for the Gantnier violation restitution
should not be ordered.
that

he

had

been

With regard to Mr. Holmes he simply felt

overcharged

for

the

work.

Ms.

Meakin's

complaints are unclear except that she too felt that she had paid
too much.

Mr. Cote's testimony is quite frankly quite incredible

on its face and the Victor Road people do not seem to the court to
have complaints which deserve restitution.

Neither the Grays nor

Mr. Eichel appeared in court and there does not appear to be any
evidence as to what damage they may have suffered or any reason
why restitution

should be

ordered.

The

Lokers

received

full

restitution.
With regard to the Gantniers,

however,

the court believes

that the violation was particularly egregious, there may well have
been double payment solicited and obtained,

and it appears that

i
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work was done which was not requested.

It is also clear, however,

that the Gantniers received some value for their payment.

The

court will therefore order restitution in the amount of $2,500.00
paid to the Gantniers.
With regard to civil penalties,

it is the court's feeling

that anything approaching $10,000 per violation would be overkill,
would really accomplish nothing since it obviously cannot possibly
be

paid,

and

is

simply

complained of and proved.

too

severe

considering

the

conduct

The court finds that there are nine (9)

violations which have been proved -- those being the violations
with regard to Ms. Meakin, the Grays, the Gantniers, Mr. Cote, Mr.
Holmes, Ms. Linnell, Mrs. Kucharski, Ms. Stevens, and the Lokers.
The court will order a civil penalty of $500.00 for each of those
violations.
It is clear from the evidence presented that the defendant
engaged in conduct which violated both the law and the terms of
the Consent Order of August 31, 1981, with full knowledge of what
he was doing.
presented.

No other conclusion is possible from the evidence
Therefore,

solicitation
inappropriate.

of

an

paving
The court

injunction prohibiting

work

would

not

is convinced,

be

door-to-door

unreasonable

however,

that

or

such an

order would with some degree of certainty put the defendant out-of
business.

That does not appear to the court to be a desirable-

result of this process at this time.

The defendant deserves one

more chance to demonstrate that he can operate within the law.

(
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In an attempt to impress upon the defendant the seriousness
with which the court views his conduct while at the same time
allowing
business,

him

to

maintain

this

extremely

important

source

the court will permanently enjoin the defendant

of

from

door-to-door solicitation' of paving jobs but stay the effective
date

of

that

injunction

until

such

time

as

it

has

been

demonstrated that Mr. Stanley has once again violated the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act or violates the Consent Order of August 31,
1981.
will

In order to enforce this- conditional injunction, the court
order

that

a copy of

each

contract

entered

into by Mr.

Stanley be filed with the Consumer and Antitrust Division of the
Attorney General's Office.

Each contract is to contain the name,

complete mailing address, and telephone number of each person with
whom Mr. Stanley contracts so that the Attorney General's office
will by

simply

randomly telephoning these people,

ascertain whether Mr.

Stanley

is giving the proper

be

able to

three

day

waiting period before beginning work and will, of course, be able
to tell from the contracts themselves whether they contain the
required language.

Just one failure to use the proper contract

language or to fail to wait the required three days is all that
will be required to place thi~

DATED:

-- ^

---

November 19, 1991
BftUCE W. CHANDLER
JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
OCKET NO. CV-80-511

\\

STATE OF MAINE
Plaintiff

)■
DECISION

V .

AND

ORDER

WILLIAM STANLEY
Defendant

This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's Motions
for Cost of Litigation and Attorney's Fees and defendant's Motion
for Partial Relief from Judgment.
On November 19, 1991, following jury-waived trial, the court
issued its findings of fact and order of judgment.
judgment

indicated that the evidence

there had been nine

The order of

convinced the

court that

(9) separate violations of the statute in

question by defendant and the court ordered the defendant to pay
restitution to one complainant and civil penalties in the amount
of $500.00 for each violation.

In issuing its order, the court

made an error with regard to one of the violations, which has been
called to its attention by both plaintiff and defendant.
The court found that with regard to a Mr. Holmes in Eastport
there had not been solicitation by the defendant or any of his
agents or employees.

The court, nevertheless, included the Holmes

job as one of the nine violations.

This was in error as the court

is convinced that Mr. Holmes was not solicited.

However,

this

does not change the ultimate outcome because the court also erred
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by making a finding that a paving job was done on July 19, 1990,
for Donald Eichel of Milo which constituted a violation and then
failing to list the Eichel job as one of the violations on page 9
of the Memorandum of Decision.

This was also an error so that the

Memorandum of Decision should be altered to "delist" the Holmes
job as a violation but add the Eichel job.

This requires no

change in the actual order which did not name each of the nine
violations.
With

regard

to

that

part

of the

defendant 's Motion

for

Partial Relief from Judgment relating to the Mrs. Meakin job, the
court has reviewed its findings and remains convinced that the
defendant's

conduct

with

regard

to

that

job

constituted

solicitation and the Meakin job, therefore, remains as a violation
found by

the

court

and' subject

to the

$500.00

civil

penalty

imposed.
With

regard to the State's Motion

for Attorney Fees

and

Costs, the court finds with one exception that the fees and costs
should be allowed as requested.

The court is convinced that the

Attorney General's Department is not limited and should not be
limited to requesting an award o f .attorney's fees based simply on
an assistant attorney general's annual salary reduced to an hourly
rate multiplied by the number of hours.

Rather, cases have made

it clear that the Department may request an award of reasonable
attorney's

fees

geographic area.

based

on

what

is

a

One hundred dollars

reasonable fee in this area at this time.

reasonable
($100.00)

fee

in

the

per hour is a

Furthermore, the court

3

finds

that

the

deposition

of

the

defendant

was,

in

fact,

a

necessary element of the State's case and that the testimony of
the expert witness, Mr. Corneil was, if not essential,
extremely

helpful

in

assisting

the

court

to

certainly

determine

a

restitution amount.
The only area of the request for attorney's fees and costs
which the court takes exception to is that portion of the request
which asks for $1, 500.00 for attorney fees in connection with a
motion to quash subpoenas which was granted by the court on the
day of trial, November 5, 1991.

The defendant is plainly wrong in

indicating that no decision was made on this motion.

A decision

was made, helped along in part by the fact that certain documents
were provided to the defendant by plaintiff.
clear

that

the

motion

to

quash

the

Nevertheless, it is

subpoenas

requiring

the

presence and testimony of the three assistant attorneys general
would have been quashed in any event.

The court does not feel,

however, that $1,500.00 is a reasonable amount of money to award
as attorney's fees for work done on that particular motion.
hundred dollars

Five

($500.00) would be a reasonable and proper amount

in the court's opinion.
Since

the

matter

of

discretionary with the court,

attorney's

fees

and

costs

is

the court is reducing the amount

requested by $1,000.00 and is entering an order for payment in the
amount of $5,109.05.
The court has carefully considered the defendant's arguments
with regard to attorney's fees and costs as they relate to the
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defendant's financial condition.

While the court does not dispute

¡the facts of defendant's finances, it does not appear to the court
that

the

proper

place

for

consideration

of

the

defendant's

financial status is in a motion with regard to attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.

The court has already heavily factored in

the defendant's financial circumstances in determining both the
■amount of the civil penalties to be imposed and the timing of
their payment.

In the event a disclosure hearing was ever held as

part of an enforcement attempt or collection attempt, it would be
proper for the defendant's financial consideration to again be a
factor.

It should not,

¡reasonable amount

however,

of attorney's

be a factor in determining a
fees and costs to be awarded.

That amount should be determined by an evaluation of time spent,
actual expenses incurred, and application of a reasonable hourly
rate to the time spent in preparation and trial.
The

court

defendant's

does

financial

feel,

however,

that

it

should

consider

situation in determining the time period

within which the attorney's fees and expenses should be paid and
the court is therefore including as part of its order a provision
that those fees and expenses are to be paid within two
of the date of the original order of judgment^
November 19, 1991-.

Payment of the fees ant

due on or before November 19,

DATED:

January V? , 1992
BRUCE W. CHANDLfiR^
JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT

(2) years
was~ctated

State of Maine

Department of the Attorney General
Augusta, Maine 04333

For Release:
April 4, 1991
C on tact: Lucinda E. White

M ichael E. Carpenter

Assistant Attorney General
289-3661
Attorney General Michael E. Carpenter announced today that

ATTORNEY

GENERAL

his Consumer and Antitrust Division has filed a motion in the
Kennebec County Superior Court reopening the State's unfair
trade practice action against driveway paver William C. Stanley
of Biddeford, Maine.

In 1981, Mr. Stanley entered into a

consent decree with the State that was approved by the Court
prohibiting Mr. Stanley, his agents and employees, from
violating Maine's Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
In moving to reopen this action, Attorney General Carpenter
stated, "since Mr. Stanley has repeatedly violated the Court's
Order, we have no recourse but to request the Court to reopen
the case and impose new remedies.

Additional remedial measures

are clearly necessary to protect Maine consumers from Mr.
Stanley's sales practices.

The paving season is again upon us

and there is clearly a need for these laws to be strictly
enforced."
Under the terms of the original consent order, Stanley was
required, when selling asphalt paving services through
door-to-door solicitations, to inform customers that they have
three business days to void the contract, not to begin work
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before the three business day period had passed, and to use
i

specific written contracts incorporating language meeting the
minimal requirements set forth in Maine's Consumer Solicitation
Sales Act.

The Attorney General alleged in his motion that

Stanley had committed at least ten separate violations of the
consent decree.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, S S ,

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-80-511

STATE OF MAINE
Plaintiff
v.
WILLIAM C. STANLEY

)
MOTION FOR CIVIL
PENALTIES AND TO
AMEND ORDER
(5 M.R.S.A. § 209)

Defendant

The Plaintiff State of Maine hereby moves this Court
pursuant to the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (hereafter
UTPA), specifically 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 (1979 & Supp. 1989), for
an Order compelling the Defendant William C. Stanley to
forfeit and pay to the State civil penalties for violations of
the terms of an injunction issued pursuant to the UTPA by this
Court on August 31, 1981.
Furthermore, pursuant to the Court's powers under
5 M.R.S.A. § 209 (1979 & Supp. 1990) to restrain and to
prevent violations of the UTPA (5 M.R.S.A. § 205-A, et seq.),
Plaintiff moves this Court to amend its Order of August 31,
1981, to henceforth permanently enjoin the Defendent William
C. Stanley, his agents, employees, and persons acting in
concert with him, from engaging in consumer solicitation sales
(as defined in 32 M.R.S.A. § 4661 et seq.) of paving services
in the State of Maine.
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In support of this Motion, Plaintiff states the following
facts.
1.

On August 31, 1981, this Court approved a Consent

Order (per Justice Alexander) (attached as Appendix A)
entered into by the Defendant with the State of Maine which
permanently enjoined the Defendant, his agents, employees, and
persons acting in concert with him, in soliciting contracts
for paving jobs, from:
A.

Violating the requirements of the Consumer

Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661, et seg.);
B.

Not informing customers that they have three

business days to void the contract; and
C.

Starting work before the three business day

period has passed.
2.

This Court further ordered the Defendant, when

offering paving services, to use written contracts
incorporating certain language (or its reasonable equivalent)
set forth in a sample contract attached to the Consent Order
(i .e ., language meeting the minimal requirements set forth in
the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. § 4662).
3.

Pursuant to the Consent Order, this Court retained

jurisdiction for the purpose of enabling any party to the
Consent Order to seek further orders or the enforcement of the
Consent Order.
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4.

The Defendant, d/b/a Quality Paving, has, on multiple

occasions, violated the Consent Order in the course of selling
asphalt paving services through door-to-door solicitations by:
A.

failing to provide a written contract;

B.

failing to provide a written contract containing

the language (or its reasonable equivalent) set forth
in the sample contract attached to the Consent Order;
and
C.

failing to wait three full business days from

the time a binding contract is signed before
performing work.
5.

The Defendant William C. Stanley, d/b/a Quality

Paving, has violated the terms of the Consent Order by selling
asphalt paving services through door-to-door solicitations in
each of the following described instances.
A.

On or about August 16, 1990, the Defendant

performed paving services for Margaret Meakin, of
Dexter, Maine on the day after he executed a written
contract with Mrs. Meakin.

In addition, the

Defendant back-dated the contract, and used a
contract that failed to state that the seller would
not begin performance so long as the consumer had the
right to cancel, that did not state the mailing
address of the seller's permanent place of business,
and that was not signed by the seller.
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B.

On or about July 24, 1990, the Defendant

performed paving services for Donald Eichel, of Milo,
Maine, on the same day on which he executed a written
contract with Mr. Eichel.

In addition, the Defendant

back-dated the contract, and used a contract that
failed to state that the seller would not begin
performance so long as the consumer had the right to
cancel, that did not state the mailing address of the
seller's permanent place of business, and that was
not signed by the seller.
C.

On or about July 19, 1990, the Defendant

performed paving services for Dorothy and Fred Gray,
d/b/a Skateway Roller Rink, Park Street, Milo, Maine,
pursuant to a written contract dated July 17, 1990,
without waiting the required three full business
days.

In addition, the Defendant used a contract

that failed to state that the seller would not begin
performance as long as the consumer had the right to
cancel and that failed to state the mailing address
of the seller's permanent place of business.
D.

On or about June 7, 1990, the Defendant

performed paving services for Ngoc Thi Gantnier,
d/b/a Phu Loi Tastee Freeze, Route 157, Medway,
Maine, on the same day on which he executed a written
contract with Mrs. Gantnier.

In addition, the
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Defendant used a contract that failed to state that
the seller would not begin performance as long as the
consumer had the right to cancel and that failed to
state the mailing address of the seller's permanent
place of business.
E.

On or about July 26, 1988, the Defendant

performed paving services for Blanche and Paul Cote,
3 Rosedale Avenue, Old Orchard Beach, Maine, without
waiting the required three full business days.

In

addition, the Defendant used a contract that failed
to state that the seller would not begin performance
as

long as

the consumer

had

the

F.

On

about August

27,

1987, theDefendant

or

rightto cancell.

performed paving services for Oliver W. Holmes, Route
1, Box 133, Eastport, Maine, pursuant to a written
contract dated August 25 and August 26, 1987, without
waiting the required three full business days.

In

addition, the Defendant used a contract that failed
to state that the seller would not begin performance
as

long as

the consumer

G.

On

about July 23, 1987,

or

had

the

rightto cancel.
the Defendant

performed paying services for Thelma Rideout, 192
North Street, Calais, Maine, on the same day on which
he executed a written contract with Mrs. Rideout.
addition, the Defendant used a contract that failed

In
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to state that the seller would not begin performance
as long as the consumer had the right to cancel.
H.

On or about May 14, 1986, the Defendant

performed paving services for Hazel E. Linnell, 66
Victor Road, Portland, Maine, on the same day on
which he executed a written contract with Mrs.
Linnell.

In addition, the Defendant used a contract

that was not signed by the customer, failed to state
the customer's name and address, and failed to state
that the seller would not begin performance as long
as the consumer had the right to cancel.
I.

On or about May 14, 1986, the Defendant

performed paving services for Katherine Kucharski, 77
Victor Road, Portland, Maine, on the same day on
which he executed a written contract with Mrs.
Kucharski.

In addition, the Defendant used a

contract that failed to state that the seller would
not begin performance as long as the consumer had the
right to cancel.
J.

On or about May 14, 1986, the Defendant

performed paving services for Hilda Stevens, 83
Victor Road, Portland, Maine, pursuant to a written
contract dated May 13, 1986, without waiting the
required three full business days.

In addition, the

Defendant used a contract on which the language
regarding the buyer's right to cancel was illegible.
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K.

In the summer of 1^5*^ the Defendant performed
<2>
paving services for Charles Lok^'r, of Falmouth, Maine,
J

pursuant to a written contract without waiting the required
three full business days.
WHEREFORE, the State of Maine respectfully prays that this
Honorable Court make the following findings and provide the
following relief:
1.

Declare that the Defendant William C. Stanley has

violated the terms of the Consent Order;
2.

Order the Defendant to forfeit and pay to the State a

civil penalty of a maximum of $10,000.00 per violation;
3.

Order that the Consent Decree be amended to

permanently enjoin the Defendant, his agents, employees, and
persons acting in concert with him, from engaging in consumer
solicitation sales of paving services in the State of Maine;
4.

Order the Defendant to identify all Maine consumers

(including but not limited to those identified in this Motion)
who purchased paving services from the Defendant through
door-to-door solicitations subsequent to the 1981 Consent
Decree and restore to them such money including interest as
may be necessary to compensate each of them for any
ascertainable losses occasioned by the Defendant's violation
of the terms of the Court's injunction; and
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5.

Order the Defendant to pay all costs of investigation

and suit.

Dated:

April 4, 1991

MICHAEL E. CARPENTER
Attorney General
STEPHEN L. WESSLER
Deputy Attorney General

LUCINDA E. WHITE
Assistant Attorney General
State House Station #6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 289-3661
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SUPERIOR COURT
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KENNEBEC, S S .

*

STATE OF MAINE,

£
Plaintiff *
*

*

v.
WILLI/\M STANLEY I

CONSENT ORDER

*
*

Defendant *
*

j..

Plaintiff, State of Maine, filed its Complaint and

Affidavit alleging, in part, that the Defendant has operated
his asphalt paving and sealing business in violation of the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A.
and the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act
2.

§ 4661 et_ seq.)

(5 M.R.S.A.

§ 206 e_t seo .)

Plaintiff and Defendant mutually have approved the

terms of this Order.
3.

Therefore, this Court finding that the Complaint states

a cause of action and that it has jurisdiction in this matter,
hereby permanently enjoins the Defendant, his agents, employees,
persons acting in .concert with him, in soliciting contracts for
paving jobs from:
A.

Violating the requirements of the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act;

B.

Not informing customers they have three business
days to avoid the contract; and

Starting work before the three business dav

c.

p er io d has p a s secl.
4.

Further, this Court orders the Defendant to use written

contracts that incorporate language reasonably equivalent to
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the attached sample contract.
5.

The Defendant understands that this Consent Order refers

only to how1 the Defendant v;ill solicit business in the future but
does not resolve the issue of v.'hether any consumer is owed damaoes
or repairs for past unfair trade practices by the Defendant.

This

aspect of the State's Complaint remains before the Court for
p erinan en t resol u tion .
6.

The Court retains jnrisdiction over the subject matter

of this action and its parties for the purpose of applvj.no to this
Court at

time for further orders or directions -which may be

any

appropriateDated at Auausta this

Seen and Agr eed b y :

A

.
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JAMES A. McKENNA, III
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer and Antitrust Division

WITNESS

cot; i'iV'.croR1s

n am e _________________________________

ADDRESS

__________

PiION E

__________

________ ______________

________ __ ________ ^_____ __________________

CUSTOMER'S NAME

__________ |__________________________________

ADDRESS

______ ________ _______ __ __ _

P H O N E ____________________________ ________________
C U S T O M E R 'S RIGHT TO C A N C E L CONTRACT WITH IN THREE BUSINESS DAYS.
customer can
to

cancel

the Contractor

this

notice

contract witliin

address

•••••.! thin

days

tin.- day
work

three business
this

contract

is

ocreeci to in this

cellation period has

LORE TO BE DONE.
furnish

signed.

contract

permit,

this work
___ ,

6.

long
is

until

the

following

not begin

three business

the

day c a n 

the sum. of $ _______

as

manner.

to complete

The work

conditions

beyond

to s t a r t ___________ ,

, v;ill

the work

to be done

is as follows:

the Contractor's

19

agreed

control

and is to be completed

The C u s t o m e r will pay

for

the Contractor's work

as

__________ _____ __________________________________

This d o c u m e n t

contractor and

contains

the customer.

bv both oar tics and dated.
charge

in the mail

19

PAYMENT TERMS.

SIGNATURES.

The Contra c t o r will

labor and equipment

oil ows :

7.

and m u s t be placed

The C o n t r a c t o r , for

As

notice must be sent to

passed.

all materials,

.STARTING DATE.

above

This

(Saturday and Sunday do not count)

to in a good and w o r k m a n l i k e

■y.

three business days by mailing

of cancellation.

Lilt Contractor at the

The

the entire

It is not

agreement between

a binding

contract until

For any additional work

the
signed

the contractor may

the c u s t o m e r extra.
C o n t r a c t o r _________ ___________________________
Custo m e r
Da te

______________________________
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*

*

STATE OF MAINE

*

Plaintiff
v
WILLIAM STANLEY I

*
*
*
*
*

CONSENT ORDER

*

Defendant

1.

*

Plaintiff, State of Maine, filed its Complaint and

Affidavit alleging, in part, that the Defendant William Stanley
has operated his asphalt paving and sealing business in violation
of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. § 4661 et seq;)
and the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (5 M.R.S.A. § 206 £t seg^.) .
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant mutually have approved the

terms of this Order.
3.

Therefore, this Court finding that the Complaint states

a cause of action and that it has jurisdiction in this matter,
hereby permanently enjoins the Defendant, his agents, employees,
persons acting in concert with him in soliciting contracts for
paving jobs from:
A.

Violating the requirements of the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act

B.

Not informing customers they have three business
days to avoid the contract; and

V

I
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C.

Starting work before the three business day

■#

period has passed.
4.

Further, this Court orders the Defendant to use written

contracts that incorporate language reasonably equivalent to
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the attached sample contract,
Appendix A.
5.

Further, this Court orders the Defendant to pay the

State's costs of investigation in the amount of $100 and to
reimburse consumers in accordance with the schedule of payments
set forth in Appendix B.
6.

The Court retains jurisdiction over the subject matter

of this action and its parties for the purpose of applying to
this Court at any time for further orders or directions which
may be appropriate.
Dated at Augusta this

day of

JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT

Seen and Agreed by:

Attorney for the Defendant

JAMES A. McKenna, III
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer and Antitrust Division

1981.

APPENDIX A

CONTRACTOR'S NAME
-

ADDRESS
PHONE

CUSTOMER'S NAME
ADDRESS
PHONE
3.

CUSTOMER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL CONTRACT WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS. The
customer can cancel this contract within three business days by mailin
to the Contractor notice of cancellation. This notice must be sent to
the Contractor at the address above and must be placed in the mail
within three business days (Saturday and Sunday do not count) followin
the day this contract is signed. The Contractor will not begin the
work agreed to in this contract until the three business day can
cellation period has passed.

4.

WORK TO BE DONE. The Contractor, for the sum of $__________ , will
furnish all materials, labor and equipment to complete the work agreed
to in a good and workmanlike manner. The work to be done is as follow

5.

STARTING DATE. As long as conditionsbeyond the Contractor's control
permit, this work is to start on ____________ , 19
and is to be
completed on _______________ , 19

6.

PAYMENT TERMS.
follows:

7.

SIGNATURES. This document contains the entire agreement between the
contractor and the customer. It is not a binding contract until signed
by both parties and dated. For any additional work the contractor
may charge the customer extra.

The Customer will pay for the Contractor's work as

Contractor _______________________________
Customer
Date

SCHEDULE B
REIMBURSEMENTS FOR UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
1.
The Defendant shall pay to the consumer named below
$175 within thirty days of the entry of this decree:
Mr. Bird U. Shellenburger
Meadow Road
Topsham, ME 04086

STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-80-511

KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
VS.
)
)
WILLIAM STANLEY, an in- )
dividual and resident of)
County of York, d/b/a
)
Down East Paving,
)
)
Defendant
)

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

Now comes the Attorney for the State of Maine and files its
Pre-Trial Memorandum in the above matter:
1.
date.

Time of Trial.

Trial is sought at the first available

Estimated time needed: 1/2 day.
2.

Nature of the case.

This case is brought under the Maine

Unfair Trade Practices Act (5 M.R.S.A. § 206 et seg.) and the Consumer
Solicitations Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. § 4661 et seg.), alleging that
the Defendant has committed unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in trade or commerce.
3.

Statement of issues.

Do the following alleged actions by

the Defendant constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
trade or commerce:
A.

Solicitation of business in violation of the .

Consumer Solicitation Sales Act;
B.

Charging an excessive price for laying peastone

on an unprepared surface.
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4.

Proposed stipulations and admissions.

It is requested

that the Defendant admit that:
A.

Prior to the Preliminary Injunction issued

against him in this case on October 7, 1980, his
contracts for driveway paving or sealing work done
by him did not meet the specific requirements of ’
the Consumer Solciitation Sales Act set forth in
32 M.R.S.A. § 4662, in that they did not contain a
statement of the consumers three day right to avoid.
B.

He did not have in this state, in either 1979

or 1980 either a home residence or a place of business
for which he held a 12-month lease or rental agreement.
5.

List of documents requested to be produced at the

Pre-Trial Conference by the opposing party.
A.

A sample of the contract currently given by the

Defendant to a Maine consumer who has accepted the
Defendant's solicitation for paving or sealing work; and
B.

Copies of each paving or sealing contract entered

into by the Defendant which was the result of a solicita
tion by the Defendant in Maineand which occurred after
the Preliminary Injunction ordered in this case on
October 7, 1980.
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6.

List of Exhibits.

A.

Defendant's contract for paving job for Mr. Bird

U. Shellenbarger, Topsham, Maine.

i

B.

Downeast Paving business card.

C.

Contract for Arthur Thompson's paving job.

7.

Offer of settlement.

See attached Consent Decree.

8.

Restitution claimed.

$175 to Mr. Bird Shellenbarger,

Topsham, Maine.
9.

List of witnesses.

A.

Bird Shellenbarger, Topsham, Maine 04086

B.

Daniel R. Libby, Standish, Maine.

C.

Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Thompson, Standish, Maine

D.

Steven Holt, Trooper, State Police.

The State of Maine reserves the right to supplement this list
on reasonable notice to the Defendant.
Dated:

March 26, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

JAMES A. MCKENNA, III
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer and Antitrust Division
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STATE OF MAINE,

*
*

Plaintiff
V .

*
*
*

*
WILLIAM STANLEY, an individual *
and resident of the County of *
York, d/b/a Down East Paving, *

COMPLAINT AND MOTIONS FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

*

Defendant

*

The State of Maine, by and through its Attorney General,
Richard S. Cohen, alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

The Attorney General commences this action in the public

interest pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 206 et seq., commonly known as
the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.
2.

T K^

/,

Defendant William Stanley is an individual resident in

the County of York, State of Maine, and doing business as an
asphalt paving contractor under the name of

Down East Paving.
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NATURE OF TRADE AND COMMERCE
3.

Defendant James Stanley engages in the business of

asphalt ("hot top") and gravel paving, specializing in the
preparation and paving of driveways, walkways, and other areas
contiguous to residential homes and garages normally subject

A

to asphalt paving.
4.

In pursuit of asphalt paving business. Defendant

James Stanley regularly travels around the State of Maine in
the warmer months of the year, soliciting homeowners to have
their driveways and walkways paved by Mr. Stanley.
5.

A

In furtherance of his asphalt paving business, Defendant

James Stanley operates certain trucks, and equipment for the
preparation and asphalt paving of the driveway,
VIOLATIONS ALLEGED
6.

In at least two instances known to the Attorney General

the Defendant James Stanley unfairly solicited paving jobs in
violation of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A.
§ 4661 et seq.).
7.

D

It is an unfair trade practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A.

§ 207 to solicit business in violation of the Consumer Solicitation
Sales Act.
8.

-1- K ^

. £)

In at least one instance known to the Attorney General

Defendant James Stanley charged an excessive price for laying
peastone on an unprepared surface.
9.

^

It is an unfair trade practice to charge an excessive

price for inferior work and a violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207. ^ ^
b
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RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff State of Maine respectfully requests
;
that this Court:
1.

Decree that Defendant William Stanley has engaged

in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
trade or commerce in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
2.

Permanently enjoin Defendant William Stanley from

engaging in the business of asphalt paving in the State of Maine
until he has had approved by the Department of the Attorney
General a sample contract that satisfies the requirements of
the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. § 4661 et seq.).
3.

Order the Defendant William Stanley to henceforth

use this or an equivalent contract in his door-to-door solicita
tions for residential paving or sealing work costing $25 or more.
4.

Order the Defendant William Stanley to adhere to

the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act and not commence any resi
dential paving or sealing work regulated by that statute until
three business days have elapsed since the signing of the
contract by the Consumer and the Defendant.
5.

Restore to all homeowners who have lost money as

a result of Defendant William Stanley's violations of 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 207 in an amount not to exceed the amount acquired from these
homeowners by Defendant Stanley as a result of these violations.
6.

Award to the Plaintiff State of Maine its costs of

suit as provided in 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.

*
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7.

Grant such further relief as the case may require

and the Court may deem just and proper.
\

!

DATED:

r

>

i

'

A A- * ^

/1a
i\ L
James A. McKenna, III
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer and Antitrust Division
Department of the Attorney General
State Office Building, Room 505
Augusta, Maine 04333
289-3716
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